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LITEKY V. UNITED STATES: THE SUPREME COURT
RESTRICTS THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BIASED
FEDERAL JUDGES UNDER SECTION 455(A)
Democracy must, indeed, fail unless our courts try cases
fairly, and there can be no fair trial before a judge lacking
in impartiality and disinterestedness.

-Judge

Jerome Frank

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the basic tenets of our judicial system is the right of
litigants to have a neutral and impartial judge preside over
their case.' Over the last two hundred years, American legislatures and courts have sought to "secure the impartiality of trial
judges by requiring judges to disqualify themselves in various
circumstances."' The latest Supreme Court case to consider the
issue of judicial disqualification was Liteky v. United States.4
This casenote addresses the development of judicial disqualification law before and through the Liteky decision, and it also
analyzes and predicts Liteky's impact on future cases. Part II
briefly discusses the history of American judicial disqualification
statutes. Part III traces the evolution of case law interpreting
those statutes prior to Liteky and encompasses an overview of
the development of the extrajudicial source doctrine5 and the

1. In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943).
2. See, e.g., Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and FinancialInterest as Grounds for
Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 662, 662 (1985); Helena
K. Kobrin, Comment, Disqualification of Federal District Judges-Problems and Proposals, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 612, 612 (1976).
3. Susan B. Hoekema, Questioning the Impartiality of Judges: Disqualifying Federal District Court Judges Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 697, 697 (1987).
4. 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994).
5. The extrajudicial source doctrine concerns the origin of a judge's bias. Under
this doctrine, if bias or partiality arises from conduct within the courtroom, it cannot
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pervasive bias exception.' Part IV reviews the Liteky decision.
Part V analyzes Liteky, addressing its actual and theoretical
impact on judicial disqualification jurisprudence, and notes an
alternative to statutory disqualification that attorneys can pursue to circumvent Liteky.

II.

STATUTORY HISTORY OF JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION

7

To appreciate the Court's holding in Liteky, it is essential to
review the statutory basis for the decision.' In 1911, Congress
revised the Judicial Code, enacting Judiciary Act sections 20'

form the basis of a recusal claim.
6. The pervasive bias exception refers to a narrow circumstance through which a
litigant could circumvent the extrajudicial source doctrine. It was first announced by
the Fifth Circuit in Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975),
when the court held that "there is an exception (to the extrajudicial source rule)
where such pervasive bias and prejudice is shown by otherwise judicial conduct as
would constitute bias against a party." Id. at 1051.
7. The international history of judicial disqualification law began with the basis
of Roman civil law, the Code of Justinian, which provided that "[a]lthough a judge
has been appointed by imperial power yet because it is our pleasure that all
litigations should proceed without suspicion, let it be permitted to him, who thinks
the judge under suspicion to recuse him before an issue joined, so that the cause go
to another." Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 n.10 (1923)
(translating CODE J. 3.1.16). By the early seventeenth century, the prevailing common
law view was expressed by Lord Coke: "Aliquis non debet esse judex in propris

causa" (no man shall be a judge in his own case). Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
638, 652 (KB. 1608); Margaret F. Evans, Comment, Disqualification of Federal
Judges-the Need for Better Guidelines, 13 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 353, 356 (1977). As
of 1852, the courts of England had broadened the disqualification concept to encompass proprietary interests. Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal, 10
Eng. Rep. 301, 305 (1852) (holding that the judge was "incompetent to hear and
decide the suit" because he "was the holder of shares in [the] company"). Over the
next twenty years, British common law courts began to recognize that an additional
ground for disqualification may be actual bias. The Queen v. Meyer, 1 Q.B.D. 173,
177 (1875) (stating that the justice was "substantially interested, though not in a
pecuniary sense, so as to be likely to have a real bias in the matter").
8. The first United States statute that governed the disqualification of judges
was enacted in 1792. An Act to Regulate the Process of the Courts in the United
States, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278 (1792). In 1821, this statutory provision was expanded to require disqualification when the judge was related or otherwise connected
to a party in the litigation. An Act for Regulating Process in the Courts of the United States ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643 (1821). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, enacted in 1868, guarantees every litigant the right to an impartial
court. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ...
deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."); e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.").
9. The Judiciary Act, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090 (1911) (codified as
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and 21.0 Section 21" was later revised and outlined the procedures that a party must follow in order to disqualify a district court judge when personal bias or prejudice was alleged.'2
Section 20 was also revised in 1948' to specify the specific
grounds for disqualification and was codified at 28 U.S.C. §
455.14 Section 455 was amended in 197415 to reflect the proviamended at 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988)). The relevant text of the section's 1911 version
is as follows:
is in any way concerned in
Whenever it appears that the judge ...
interest in any suit pending [before him] . . . as to render it improper,
in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, it shall be his duty . . . to
cause the fact to be entered on the records of the court.

Id.
10. The Judiciary Act § 21, 36 Stat. at 1087 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 144
(1988)). Section 21's relevant text reads:
Whenever a party to any action... shall make and file an affidavit
is to be tried or heard has a
that the judge before whom the action ...
personal bias and prejudice either against him or in favor of any opposite
Evparty to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein ....
be filed not less that ten days before the
ery such affidavit shall ...
beginning of the term of court.
Id. (emphasis added).
11. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, ch. 646, § 144, 62 Stat. 869, 898 (1948)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988)). The text of current § 144 states:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a
timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor
of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but
another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988).
12. The term "recusal" typically refers to the process by which a judge is disqualified. Adam J. Safer, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Extrajudicial Source Requirement for JudicialDisqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 15 CARDoZO L. REv. 787,
787 n.3 (1993); see Putnam, supra note 7, at 1. Courts now commonly use the terms
"recusal" and "disqualification" interchangeably. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d
764, 769 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992). This casenote will also use the terms interchangeably.
To file a recusal motion under § 144, one must file an affidavit which (1)
"specifies the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudiced exists;" (2) is
accompanied by "a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good
faith;" and (3) is filed "not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at
which the proceeding is to be heard," unless good cause is shown otherwise.
13. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 869, 908 (1948)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970)). This older version of § 455 reads as
follows:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or
has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any
party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to
sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
Id.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
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sions in Canon 3 of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. 6 The
primary statutory focus of this casenote is section 455(a) which
states: "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 7
III. SECTION 455(A) BEFORE LITEKY

The extrajudicial source doctrine discussed in Liteky 8 originated in a series of cases addressing section 21 and its successor, section 144. The doctrine, as currently applied to section
144 and section 455, is solely a creature of the judiciary.
A. Early Cases
Section 21 of the Judicial Code 9 was the first American
statute to recognize bias or prejudice as a ground for
disqualification.' ° The extrajudicial source requirement addressed in Liteky had its basis in two Supreme Court cases that
interpreted section 21.
The first Supreme Court case, Ex parte American Steel Barrel
Co.," specifically addressed the newly enacted section 21 of
the Judicial Code.' The petitioners in that case alleged that
the presiding judge manifested a strong bias and prejudice
15. Judicial Disqualification Act, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (1979). The
relevant text of the amended § 455 reads as follows:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceeding.
Id. (emphasis added).
16. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990).

17. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
18. Liteky v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1150-58 (1994).
19. The Judiciary Act, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090 (1911) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988)).
20. Safer, supra note 12, at 798.
21. 230 U.S. 35 (1913).
22. Section 21 was referred to but not discussed in Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S.
420 (1912).
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toward them throughout the proceedings.' In denying their
motion for recusal, the Court held that any section 21 disqualification claim must be based on a showing of personal bias or
prejudice.' The significance of the Barrel opinion lies in the
passage that became the genesis of the extrajudicial source rule
addressed in Liteky.' The court stated: "[Section 21] was never intended to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of adverse rulings made [by that judge]."26
The Supreme Court addressed section 21 again in 1921 in
Berger v. United States." Berger clarified American Steel
Barrel's holding by concluding that "[Barrel] establishes that
the bias or prejudice which can be urged against a judge must
be based upon something other than the rulings in the case.'
The language in Berger has had a "profound effect on disqualification jurisprudence as the foundation upon which later cases
would establish the extrajudicial source requirement."29
B. The ExtrajudicialSource Doctrine
At this point in its development, the extrajudicial source
doctrine remained relatively narrow. However, forty-five years
after Berger, the Court once again approached the issue of
disqualification in a case involving section 21's successor.

23. American Steel Barrel, 230 U.S. at 38.
24. Id. at 43.
25. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1150-58.
26. American Steel Barrel, 230 U.S. at 44. This quote, however, must be taken in
the context of the entire sentence. The full sentence states that § 21 "was never intended to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of adverse rulings
made, for such rulings are reviewable otherwise, but to prevent his future action in
the pending case." Id. Furthermore, § 21 was not "intended to paralyze the action of
a judge [by disqualifying him in the middle of a case] ....
[tihis is the plain meaning of the [ten-day filing requirement in section 21]." Id. This final piece of dicta
concerning the ten-day requirement is significant for the sole reason that it was practically ignored by the Court until its resurrection by Justice Scalia in Liteky. See
infra text accompanying notes 65-67.
27. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
28. Id. at 31.
29. Safer, supra note 12, at 799.
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1. United States v. Grinnell Corp.
Section 21, the predecessor to section 144,"0 was in question
in the case United States v. Grinnell Corp."' In denying a motion for disqualification under section 144 and relying on
Berger, the Court stated that "It]he alleged bias and prejudice
to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and
result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than
what the judge learned from his participation in the case." 2
Thus, the Supreme Court in the Grinnell opinion announced
the extrajudicial source requirement for the first time.33 However, the Court failed to announce the statutory basis for its
decision.
2. Personal Bias and Prejudice
The statutory "home" of the extrajudicial source doctrine
developed after Grinnell and before Liteky was the phrase "personal bias and prejudice" found in section 144.' Because section 455(b)(1) also contains the personal bias and prejudice
language of section 144," the extrajudicial source requirement

30. The "personal bias and prejudice" language of § 21 was duplicated in § 144.
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988).
31. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
32. Id. at 583 (emphasis added).
33. Safer, supra note 12, at 799. The "extrajudicial" language used throughout
these cases and this casenote had its origin in a number of circuit court cases. Prior
to Grinnell, the Eighth Circuit held that "the bias contemplated by [§ 144] is a personal bias, extrajudicial in origin, that a judge may have against a particular defendant." Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 686 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1029 (1967). Hodgdon's authority for the previous statement came from another
§ 21 case, Ferrari v. United States, 169 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1948). In Ferrari,the
Ninth Circuit interpreted § 21 to require a showing of a 'judge is personal bias" as a
prerequisite to disqualifying the judge. 169 F.2d at 355. The court further defined a
judge's personal bias as "an attitude of extrajudicial origin." Id.
Ferrari'sauthority for the use of the term "extrajudicial" in describing the prejudice or bias necessary under § 21 was Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605, 607
(1st Cir. 1927) ('"Personal' [as used in § 21] is in contrast with judicial; it characterizes an attitude of extra-judicial origin"). Craven was the first case, at the level of
the United States Court of Appeals, to use the term "extrajudicial" in reference to a
§ 21 bias or prejudice motion.
34. Safer, supra note 12, at 799-800. For the text of § 144, see supra note 11.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (1988). For the text of § 455(b)(1), see supra note 15.
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was universally extended to section 455(b)(1). 6 However, due
to the fact that section 455(a) does not contain the personal
bias or prejudice language of these other sections, a rift developed among the circuits as to the correct interpretation of section 455(a).
3. Circuit Split
The circuit courts split over whether section 455(a) was subject to the same extrajudicial source limitation as sections 144
and 455(b)(1).
a. Davis v. Board of School Commissioners
The Fifth Circuit in Davis was the first court to construe
revised section 455(a) to contain the extrajudicial source requirement. 7 Reading sections 144 and 455 in pari materia,3
the court held that the determination of bias under both
statutes should be made on the basis of conduct extrajudicial in
nature.3 9 The impact of Davis was remarkable as many circuits adopted its interpretation that section 455(a) is subject to
the extrajudicial source doctrine.40 Nevertheless, bias arising

36. E.g., United States v. Colon, 961 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that
personal bias means prejudice based on extrajudicial matters); United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[It is clear that by amending section 455
Congress intended to transfer the extrajudicial bias limitation contained in section
144 to section 455(b)(1)."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
37. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
38. Id. In pari materia is defined as statutes "[ulpon the same matter or subject.
Statutes 'in pari materia' are those relating to the same person or thing or having a
common purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990). There is substantial
disagreement as to whether § 144 and § 455(a) should be read together. See discussion infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
39. Davis, 517 F.2d at 1052.
40. E.g., United States v. Prichard, 875 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing
Davis for the proposition that recusal under § 455(a) must be predicated on extrajudicial conduct); In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Grinnell and
alleging that bias must derive from an extrajudicial source); Jaffe v. Grant, 793 F.2d
1182, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Grinnell in ruling that bias under § 455(a)
must stem from an extrajudicial source); United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1211
(8th Cir. 1984) (citing Grinnell in holding that the alleged bias and prejudice must
derive from an extrajudicial source); United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 869 (9th
Cir. 1980) (citing Davis in stating that § 455(a) requires recusal only when the bias
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from an intrajudicial source could be the basis of a recusal
motion if it fell within the bounds of one narrow exception. The
Fifth Circuit held that "there is an exception [to the extrajudicial source doctrine] where such pervasive bias and prejudice is
shown by otherwise
judicial conduct as would constitute bias
4
against a party. 1
b. United States v. Chantal
In contrast to the majority of circuits that interpreted section
455(a) to contain the extrajudicial source doctrine, the First
Circuit did not recognize such a construction.'
The First
Circuit's rejection of the extrajudicial source requirement for
disqualification under section 455(a) was expressed in United
States v. Chantal.' The court held that "[t]he First Circuit...
has repeatedly subscribed to what all commentators characterize as the correct view that, unlike challenges under 28 U.S.C.
§ 144, the source of the asserted bias/prejudice in a section
455(a) claim can originate explicitly in judicial proceedings.""
As a result of these inconsistent decisions, the Supreme
Court granted
certiorari to resolve the issue in Liteky v. United
45
States.

stems from an extrajudicial source); City of Cleveland v. Krupansky, 619 F.2d 576,
578 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (stating disqualification under § 455(a) must be predicated
upon extrajudicial conduct), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980); In re IBM, 618 F.2d

923, 927 (2d Cir. 1980) (agreeing with Davis that the disqualifying conduct must be
extrajudicial in nature); Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1162 n.16 (3d Cir.
1977) (citing Davis in announcing that recusal under § 455(a) should be made on the

basis of extrajudicial conduct); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 134 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (citing Grinnell in holding that recusal under § 455 is to be confined to
conduct extrajudicial in nature).
41. Davis, 517 F.2d at 1051.
42. Safer, supra note 12, at 807.
43. 902 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990).

44. Chantal, 902 F.2d at 1022. Two of the commentators referred to in the
Chantal opinion were Hoekema, supra note 3, at 717, and Bloom, supra note 2, at
676.
45. 113 S. Ct. 2412 (1993). The same issue was presented in 1992, but certiorari

was denied. Waller v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2321 (1992) (White & O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting).
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A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
On November 16, 1990, Father Ray Bourgeois, Charles
Liteky, and John Liteky entered Fort Benning Military Reservation." While there, the defendants spilled human blood on display cases, carpets, and walls of the School of the Americas at
Fort Benning' The three men committed the act to protest
the killing of six Jesuit priests" in El Salvador by School of
the Americas trainees.49
Judge J. Robert Elliot presided over the defendants' trial in
the district court. 0 Before their trial, the defendants requested
that Judge Elliot recuse himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455
because he had presided over the 1983 trial of Father
Bourgeois, which also involved a protest regarding El Salva6
dor. 1
Defendants' recusal motion was based on the conduct and
statements of Judge Elliot during the course of Father
Bourgeois' 1983 trial." On numerous occasions during the

46. Petitioners' Brief at 2, Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994) (No.
92-6921). Father Bourgeois is a Catholic priest, Charles Liteky is a Congressional
Medal of Honor recipient and Catholic priest, and John Liteky is a peace activist and
former seminarian. Id.
47. Brief for the United States at 6, Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147
(1994) (No. 92-6921).
48. Defendants were also protesting the killing of the priests' housekeeper and
her daughter. All of the murders took place on November 16, 1989. Petitioners' Brief
at 6.
49. Roland James, Terrorism Schools, PHOENIX GAzETTE, Apr. 28, 1994, at B4. Begun in Panama in 1946 and continued at Fort Bening, Georgia since 1984, the
School of the Americas has trained thousands of Latin American soldiers in what is
incorrectly termed "low intensity conflict." Id. In November 1989, when six Jesuits,
their housekeeper and her daughter were murdered, 19 of the 27 officers who would
be cited by the United Nations in the killings were trained at the School of the
Americas. Id. Additionally, Panama's Manuel Noriega is a graduate of the school.
50. Brief for the United States at 3.
51. Litkey, 114 S. Ct. at 1157. Father Bourgeois was convicted in 1983 on three
counts of trespass on government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1988),
two counts of unlawfully wearing a military uniform in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 702
(1988), and one count of misdemeanor assault, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(d)
(1988). Brief for the United States at 6; Petitioners' Brief at 3.
52. Neither Charles Liteky nor John Liteky were defendants in the 1983 trial.
Brief for the United States at 6, n.3.
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course of the trial, without objection from the prosecution,
Judge Elliot interrupted defense counsel's cross-examination
and "undertook to argue with and finally direct defense counsel
how to continue with his cross-examination."' Furthermore,
Judge Elliot led one of the prosecution's witnesses.' The judge
also interrupted the closing argument of counsel for one of
Bourgeois' co-defendants.55 Despite the presentation of the
1983 evidence, defendants' motion to recuse Judge Elliot was
denied.5" After a jury trial, the defendants were convicted in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia.'
Defendants renewed their recusal claim on appeal," citing
an Eleventh Circuit case59 and two Fifth Circuit cases. 0 The
Eleventh Circuit held that "matters arising out of the course of
judicial proceedings are not a proper basis for recusal."5 ' The
circuit court affirmed the district court's rejection of the recusal

53. Petitioners' Brief at 29-30.
54. Id. For example, Father Bourgeois faced an assault charge in the 1983 trial.
Id. While on the stand, a witness "testified that Father Bourgeois hit him with an
open hand . . . Judge Elliot, however, without any factual basis, led the witness to
testify that Father Bourgeois hit him with a closed fist." Id.
55. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1151. There was actually a laundry list of evidence from
the 1983 trial that was introduced in an attempt to establish Judge Elliot's partiality.
For example, the judge
[sitated] at the outset of the trial that its purpose was to try a criminal
case and not to provide a political forum; observ[ed] after Bourgeois'
opening statement (which described the purpose of his protest) that the
statement ought to have been directed toward the anticipated evidentiary
showing,

. . .

question[ed] witnesses; ...

and [gave] Bourgeois ...

an

excessive sentence.
Id.
56. Brief for the United States at 7 ("matters arising out of the course of judicial
proceedings are not a proper basis for recusal").
57. Brief for the United States at 2. Conviction was under 18 U.S.C. § 1361
(1988) ("Whoever willfully injures or commits any depredation against any property of
the United States . . . shall be punished."). Father Bourgeois was sentenced to one
year and four months imprisonment and Charles and John Liteky were sentenced to
six months' imprisonment. Id. at 2. Each defendant was also fined $636.47. Id. at 2.
58. United States v. Liteky, 973 F.2d 910 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), affd, 114
S. Ct. 1147 (1994).
59. United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1210 (1988).
60. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
61. Liteky, 973 F.2d at 910.
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motion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
question of whether section 455(a) "is subject to the limitation
that has
come to be known as the 'extrajudicial source' doc62
trine."
B. Majority Opinion
1. The Extrajudicial Source Doctrine
In its analysis of the extrajudicial source doctrine, the Court
reviewed the relevant statutes in order to chronicle the
doctrine's statutory history. As discussed earlier, all cases preceding Liteky found the doctrine's basis in the words "personal
bias and prejudice. "' s However, the Liteky majority took a different approach. After discussing Grinnell" and Berger,' the
Court turned to American Steel Barrel."c According to the
Court, American Steel Barrel "relied not upon the word
'personal' in [section 21 of the Judicial Code], but upon its provision requiring the recusal affidavit to be filed ten days before
the beginning of the court term."67 The Court then concluded
that it was erroneous to interpret the word "personal" as the
basis of the extrajudicial source doctrine.'
Searching for a new statutory home for the extrajudicial
source doctrine, the Court turned to the words "bias and prejudice," describing them as pejorative terms.69 The majority held
that "the origin of the 'extrajudicial source' doctrine ...

is sim-

ply the
pejorative connotation of the words 'bias or preju" 70
dice.'

62. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1150.
63. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
64. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); see supra notes 30-33

and accompanying text.
65. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921); see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
66. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1154 (citing Ex parte American Steel Barrell, 230 U.S.
35 (1913)); see supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
67. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1154; see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
68. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1154.
69. Id. at 1155. "The words [bias or prejudice] connote a favorable or unfavorable
disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate."Id.

70. Id.
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Following the historic origins discussion, the Court then addressed the main issue in the case: whether the extrajudicial
source limitation applies to section 455(a).7 ' Because the word
"personal" was not the origin of the extrajudicial source doctrine, the absence of the word in section 455(a) was not dispositive.72 However, the majority did find a foundation for the doctrine in section 455(a). The court reasoned that there is an
equivalent pejorative connotation to the term "partiality" as
there is to the terms "bias and prejudice.""
Justice Scalia then embarked on renaming the extrajudicial
source doctrine, deciding that it was more appropriate to speak
of an extrajudicial source "factor."74 Scalia reasoned that
"[slince neither the presence of an extrajudicial source necessarily establishes bias, nor the absence of an extrajudicial source
necessarily precludes bias, it would be better to speak of the
existence of a significant (and often determinative) 'extrajudicial
source' factor ...

in recusal jurisprudence."75 After a cursory,

albeit less than convincing, discussion of the reasons why sections 455(a) and 455(b)(1) must be read together,76 the Court
concluded that the extrajudicial source doctrine (or factor) applied to section 455(a)."

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1155-56. As the majority defined it, '[partiality' does not refer to all
favoritism, but only to such as is, for some reason, wrongful or inappropriate." Id. at
1156.
74. Id. at 1157.

75. Id.
76. The Court first attempted to read the extrajudicial source doctrine into § 144
by providing an alternative rationale for the Grinnell decision: it is the ten-day filing
requirement contained in both § 21 and § 144 that justified the extension of the
extrajudicial source rule to § 144. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1154. The Court does not
ratify this rationale, however, because neither § 455(a) nor § 455(b)(1) contain such a
ten-day requirement, and such reasoning would not justify the extension of the doctrine to § 455. Id. at 1160 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Citing absolutely no authority,
the Court then flatly announces that "lit seems to us that the origin of the 'extrajudicial source' doctrine ... is simply the pejorative connotation of the words 'bias or
prejudice" in §§ 144 and 455(b)(1), and the converse of the word "impartiality" in §
455(a). Id. at 1155-56.

77. Id. at 1156-57.
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2. An Impossible Exception to the Extrajudicial Source Factor
In reinterpreting the extrajudicial source doctrine, the Court
turned to Grinnell7' for guidance. Justice Scalia elucidated the
doctrine first announced in Grinnell7 9 by stating that "Grinnell
(the only opinion of ours to recite the doctrine) clearly meant by
'extrajudicial source' a source outside the judicial proceeding at
hand-which would include as extrajudicial sources earlier
judicial proceedings conducted by the same judge.""0 However,
this limitation on the extrajudicial source doctrine was shortlived.
8 1 Liteky
As in Davis v. School Board of Commissioners,
adopted a type of "pervasive bias" exception to the extrajudicial

source doctrine. Unfortunately, the scope of the exception is
extremely narrow. Despite the fact that the majority interpreted
Grinnell as recognizing earlier judicial proceedings as extrajudicial, the Court retreated to a new position:
[Qipinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis
for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.82

78. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
79. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
80. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1152. Grinnell cites Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22
(1921) as its authority because Berger "found recusal required on the basis of judicial
remarks made in an earlier proceeding." Id. at 1152 n.1.
81. 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
82. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1157 (emphasis added). The Court in Litkey notes that
an example of a statement that would make a fair judgment impossible was made by
Judge Landis in Berger v. United States:
One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not [to be] prejudiced
against the German Americans in the country. Their hearts are reeking
with disloyalty. This defendant is the kind of a man that spreads this
kind of propaganda and it has spread until it has affected practically all
the Germans in this country. This same kind of excuse of the defendant
offering to protect the German people is the same kind of excuse offered
by the pacifists in this country, who are against the United States and
have the interests of the enemy at heart ....

You are of the same

mind that practically all the German-Americans are in this country ....
Your hearts are reeking with disloyalty.
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3. Disposition and Final Ruling of Liteky
The Court concluded that "[nione of the grounds assert[ed]
required disqualification."' The grounds were inadequate because "[aill occurred in the course of judicial proceedings,
and neither (1) relied upon knowledge acquired outside such
proceedings nor (2) displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.""
V. ANALYZING LITEKY
A. An Incorrect Interpretationof Section 455(a)
1. No Reliance on Precedent
In formulating this new standard, the majority in Liteky did
not rely on any of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions that
developed the extrajudicial source doctrine.' The Court did not
depend on precedent because the line of cases from American
Steel Barrel to Grinnell provided a "less than satisfactory rationale for reading the extrajudicial source doctrine" into section
455(a). 6
The Supreme Court realized that its holding in Grinnell
placed undue weight on Berger and American Steel Barrel
(which only addressed prior adverse rulings). 7 In the words of
Justice Kennedy, "[tihere is a real difference ...
between a
rule providing that bias must arise from an extrajudicial source
[Grinnell], and one providing that judicial rulings alone can not
sustain a challenge for bias [American Steel Barrel]."' As a
post-hoc rationale to justify the holdings in American Steel
Barrel, Berger, and Grinnell, the majority turned to the ten-day

Berger v. United States, 225 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1921).
83. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1157.
84. Id. Judgment was entered for the United States, affirming the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit. Id.
85. Id. at 1152.
86. Id. at 1159 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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requirement in sections 21 and 144 as the proper, though unexpressed, statutory basis of the extrajudicial source doctrine."
Despite their new reasoning, the Court provided no justification
for the extension of the extrajudicial source doctrine to sections
455(a) and 455(b)(1). Neither of these sections contains a tenday filing requirement.'
Liteky also ignored Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition

Corp.,91 a case dealing directly with section 455(a). Although

Liljeberg did not address the extrajudicial source doctrine, it did
enunciate the showing necessary for recusal under section
455(a). 92 The Court held that "a violation of § 455(a) is established when a reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts,
would expect that a justice, judge, or magistrate knew of cir-

cumstances creating an appearance of partiality.""3 The Supreme Court in Liteky conveniently ignored this binding precedent in announcing its new standard for recusal under section
455(a).
2. Implicitly Relying on Erroneous Statutory Construction
The Liteky majority cited no authority in extending the extrajudicial source requirement from sections 144 and 455(b)(1) to
section 455(a).' Sections 144 and 455(b)(1) share identical lan-

89. Id. at 1154.
90. Id. at 1160 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Even if the ten-day requirement could
justify reading the extrajudicial source rule into § 144, it would not suffice as to §§
455(a) or 455(b)(1), which have no analogous requirement."). Using the ten-day requirement as the extrajudicial source doctrine's basis is also illogical because the
filing requirement has always had an exception for good cause and "Congress abolished formal terms of court for United States district courts" in 1963. Id.; see 28
U.S.C. § 138 (1988).
91. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
92. It is interesting to note the positions of the justices in the Liteky and
Liljeberg decisions. In Liteky, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Thomas and Ginsburg wrote the majority decision, while Justices
Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter concurred. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1150. In
Liljeberg, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Kennedy wrote for the majority. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor,
and Scalia dissented. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 849. None of the majority in Liljeberg
joined the majority in Liteky, despite the fact that the cases were decided only 7
years apart.
93. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 850.
94. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1155-56.
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guage in that the basis of a claim under either statute must be
based on "personal bias or prejudice."95 Because this language
is shared, extending the decisions surrounding the phrase in
one statute to the other statute is proper."6 Under this standard of statutory construction, it was entirely reasonable for the
extrajudicial source rule to be extended from section 144 to
section 455(b)(1).
However, the reasons for an extension to section 455(a) are
not so clear. Davis v. School Board of Commissioners7 approached section 455 in a general manner, failing to address its
subsections separately." Construing sections 144 and 455 in
pari materia, Davis concluded that the whole of section 455 is
subject to the extrajudicial source rule.9 Assuming that this is
the same doctrine that Liteky implicitly recognized as extending
the limitations of section 144 to section 455(b)(1), the Fifth
Circuit had no justification in extending the extrajudicial source
rule to section 455(a). 00
Generally, in pari materia, as a rule of construction, "cannot
be used if the statute is clear and unambiguous.. . ."o0 Sec-

tion 455(a) is not ambiguous on its face. Therefore, the Su-

95. For the full text of § 144, see supra note 11; for the full text of § 455(b)(1),
see supra note 15.
96. HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF
THE LAws, at 333-34 (1911); see Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S.
Ct. 1311, 1317-18 (1992); Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 827
(1st Cir. 1992) ("It is . . . a general rule that when Congress borrows language from
one statute and incorporates it into a second statute, the language of the two acts
should be interpreted the same way ...
[including] prior judicial interpretations of
the transplanted language.").
97. 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
98. Id. at 1051-52.
99. Id. at 1052. Less than four months after the decision in Davis, the Fifth
Circuit retreated and clarified that holding in Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d
98, 103 (5th Cir. 1975). In Parrish, the court stated that § 455(a) "is general and
does not rest on the personal bias and prejudice structure of' § 144 and § 455(b)(1).
Id. Unfortunately, it seems that most courts in addressing § 455(a) have ignored
Parrishand cited Davis as gospel.
100. At least one court has interpreted Liteky as construing § 144 and § 455(a) in
pari materia. Herskowitz v. Charney, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11594, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 18, 1994) (citing Liteky in concluding that "the two sections [144 and 455(a)]
should be construed in pari materia").
101. EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES, § 231, at 432 n.47
(1940).
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preme Court did not need to rely on any source other than the
face of section 455(a) in its analysis.
3. Ignoring the Intent and Purpose of Enacting Section 455(a)
The Court's interpretation that the "pejorative" connotation of
the word "partiality" is the basis of the extrajudicial source
doctrine in section 455(a) follows weak reasoning."' The interpretation is unacceptable because it defeats the purpose for
which the statute was enacted.
When revised section 455(a) was adopted in 1974, its goal
was to avoid even the appearance of partiality. 10 3 The stated
purpose for enacting section 455 was "to broaden and clarify
the grounds for judicial disqualification. " "'4 Liteky directly
counters these two purposes by constricting the grounds for disqualification via the extrajudicial source rule.
Congress' hope in enacting section 455(a) was to "promote
public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process." 5
One argument by those who would apply the extrajudicial
source limitation to section 455(a) is that it would reduce the
frequency of disqualification of federal judges, which, if left
unchecked, would "tend to undermine public confidence in the
judiciary by disparaging the general impartiality of judges."'
However, it is absurd to argue that it "promote[s] public confi102. Their rationale is weak for the reasons spelled out by Justice Kennedy in his
concurring opinion. "The court is correct to conclude that an allegation concerning
some extrajudicial matter is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for disqualification under any of the recusal statutes." Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1160 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). After announcing the presence of an "extrajudicial source factor," rather
than "extrajudicial source doctrine," the majority found it unnecessary to "describe the
consequences of that factor in complete detail." Id. at 1157. Again, citing no authority, the Court went on to announce the new "impossibility of fair judgment" standard.
Id.
103. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1987) (quoting
Health Serv. Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis added).
104. H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.N. 6351.
105. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6355; e.g., Lileberg, 486 U.S. at 871 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); Bloom, supra note 2, at 664; Safer, supra note 12, at 810; Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736, 746
(1973).
106. Note, supra note 105, at 747.
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dence in the judiciary to allow an apparently biased judge to
preside over a case."" 7 This appearance of partiality was the
very result that section 455(a) was designed to prevent.
In the same vein of promoting public confidence in the judiciary, supporters of the application of the extrajudicial source
doctrine to section 455(a) also argue that because the doctrine
limits the number of disqualifications, its abandonment would
result in litigants seeking "to disqualify one judge so the case
will be heard by a judge they believe is more favorable to their
side."' This "judge-shopping" argument is equally invalid because of the ethical constraints imposed on all attorneys. It
implies that attorneys will file frivolous attacks on federal judges in order to find a judge favorable to their side. This argument, however, is negated by the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make
false accusations against a judge."0 9
4. Disregard for the Plain Language of Section 455
The Liteky majority made two mistakes in its interpretation
of the language of section 455. First, it viewed f-ections 455(a)
and (b) as overlapping in many respects, thus justifying the
extension of the extrajudicial source rule to section 455(a)." 0
Although these two sections may overlap in any given situation,
they do not operate in unison. The specific situations set out in
subsection (b) "are in addition to the general standard set forth
in subsection (a).""' Thus, just as a subsection (a) motion
need not fall under any of the categories spelled out in subsection (b), neither must a subsection (b) motion fall within the
general provision of subsection (a).

107. Safer, supra note 12, at 812. To hold otherwise would imply that the public
would be more confident in the system if an apparently biased judge presided over a
case than if the apparently biased judge were disqualified. Id.
108. Bloom, supra note 2, at 664; David C. Hjemfelt, Statutory Disqualification of
Federal Judges, 30 KAN. L. REV. 255, 256 (1982).
109. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-102(B) (1979).
110. Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1156 (1994).

111. H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.
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Second, a "plain-language" argument can also be made specifically with respect to section 455(a). Section 455(a) requires
recusal when a judge's impartiality "might reasonably be
questioned" and makes no mention of an extrajudicial source
requirement." With this lack of ambiguity on the face of the
statute, it is clear that the proper focus for a section 455(a)
recusal motion is not the source of the bias, but its effect on
the judge.'
B. Creation of a Per Se Rule Dismissing Allegations of
IntrajudicialPartialityin Every Case
The majority in Liteky professed to abandon the per se rule
"which provides that 'matters arising out of the course of judicial proceedings are not a proper basis for recusal under section
455(a).""' However, the standard Liteky eventually develops
"will be difficult to distinguish from a per se extrajudicial
115
source rule, the very result the Court professes to reject."
The majority deserted the strict extrajudicial source doctrine
to the extent that they recognized that bias formed from an
intrajudicial source can constitute the basis for a recusal motion
under section 455(a)." 6 However, the Court nonetheless created a judicial zone of immunity" 7 in that a motion for
recusal that alleges intrajudicial partiality will be sustained
only where judges display the favoritism that would make fair
judgment impossible."'
This impossibility standard is the practical equivalent of the
per se rule that the majority sought to reject. Under this standard, a challenge under section 455(a) would fail "even if it
were shown that an unfair hearing were likely, for it could be

112. For the full text of § 455(a), see supra note 15. It is quite possible that Con-

gress did not even consider the extrajudicial source doctrine when it drafted section
455(a). Hjemfelt, supra note 108, at 717.
113. E.g., Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1161-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Hoekema, supra

note 3, at 717.
114.
States,
115.
116.
117.
118.

Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1159 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Liteky v. United
973 F.2d 910, 910 (11th Cir. 1992)).
Id. at 1161.
See 1d. at 1157.
Hoekema, supra note 3, at 715; see Safer, supra note 12, at 812.
Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1157.

1446

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:1427

argued that a fair hearing would be possible nonetheless."" 9
"The court's 'impossibility of fair judgment' test bears little
resemblance to the objective standard Congress adopted in
section 455(a): whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned."'20 This dichotomy between the face of the statute and the Court's interpretation of the statute is without
justification."
This is not to say that the extrajudicial source "factor," as
Justice Scalia termed it, has no utility. It is, however, a disservice to the intent of the statute to apply the doctrine as a
threshold inquiry to section 455(a). "The appropriate focus under section 455(a) is not whether a judge's statement springs
from an extrajudicial source but instead whether the judge's
statement or action would lead a reasonable person to question
whether the judge would remain impartial."" The source of
alleged bias may be relevant in determining whether or not
there is a reasonable question of a judge's impartiality. It is
unnecessary to resort to a nearly dispositive extrajudicial source
factor as a threshold inquiry. 2 '
C. Liteky's Impact: The Weakening of Section 455(a)
The Liteky majority has sounded the death-knell on the broad
protections that section 455(a) was created to provide. By creating a per se rule that dismisses allegations of intrajudicial
partiality in virtually every case, the Court has substituted its
'impossibility of fair judgment' standard for the statutory man-

119. Id. at 1161 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Hoekema, supra note 3, at 717.
123. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1163 (Kennedy, J., concurring). It is interesting to note
that the majority provided an alternative rationale for the implementation of the
extrajudicial source doctrine into § 455(a) for no other reason than to bolster a shaky
decision.
[Elven if the pejorative connotation of "partiality" were not enough to
import the "extrajudicial source" doctrine into § 455(a), the "reasonableness" limitation (recusal is required only if the judge's impartiality 'might
reasonably be questioned') would have the same effect. To demand the
sort of 'child-like innocence' that elimination of the "extrajudicial source"
limitation would require is not reasonable.
Id. at 1156 (emphasis added).
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date that "any judge ... shall disqualify himself... [when] his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. " '
The impact of the Liteky decision can already be seen in a
number of recent cases.' 5 For example, in In re Huntington
Commons Assoc., 25 the Seventh Circuit denied a section
455(a) recusal claim despite the judge's predisposition in the
matter because he did not demonstrate the "deep-seated and
unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible."" 7 In addition, a number of courts have interpreted
Liteky as leaving the prior extrajudicial source doctrine unchanged. "As [Litekyl recently held, recusal under 28 U.S.C. §
455(a) is limited
to situations involving bias from 'extrajudicial
8
sources."12
As these cases indicate, Liteky serves only to strengthen the
extrajudicial source doctrine by establishing a precedent that
squarely authorizes its application to section 455(a).' The direct result is a weakening of section 455(a). Recusal will be
required not when a judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, but rather when his impartiality stems from an
intrajudicial source which makes fair judgment impossible."'
In the words of Justice Kennedy, "[t]hat is too lenient a test
when the integrity of the judicial system is at stake."''

124. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988) (emphasis added). For the full text of section 455(a)
see supra note 15.
125. E.g., Mitchell v. Kirk, 20 F.3d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (applying
the impossibility standard of Liteky in denying a § 455(a) recusal motion).
126. 21 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1994).
127. Id. at 158 (quoting Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1157).
128. Industrial Ins. Co. v. Matsco Fin. Corp., No. C 92 2850 BAC, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5628, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1994); e.g., United States v. Bertoli, No. 945167, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30055, at *89 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 1994); In re Adams, 31
F.3d 389, 396 (6th Cir. 1994) ("The Supreme Court recently decided that the 'extrajudicial source' analysis articulated in Grinnell applies to motions for recusal under
Section 455(a) . .. .");

Herskowitz v. Charney, No. 93 Civ. 5248 (MGC), 1994 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 11594, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1994); Betts v. Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, No. 93 C 5883, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8477, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 21,
1994) ("In Liteky, the Supreme Court made it clear that the "extra-judicial source"
doctrine applies to § 455(a).").
129. See Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1157.
130. Id. Apparently, impartiality stemming from extrajudicial sources will be subjected to the objective standard on the face of § 455(a).
131. Id. at 1162 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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D. Avoiding Liteky's Extrajudicial Source Factor
In light of the solidification of the extrajudicial source rule as
applied to section 455(a), one option exists for a practitioner to
pursue to avoid the rule and the statute altogether-a procedural due process claim on appeal. A basic requirement of procedural due process is the right to a trial by an impartial
judge." 2 In fact, "[iimpartiality and the appearance of impartiality" in a judicial officer are the sine qua non of the AmeriThus, under the Due Process Clause as
can legal system.'
interpreted by the Supreme Court, there is a violation of a
litigant's constitutional rights occurs whenever the litigant is
subjected to a decision by a judge who is either in fact biased
or appears to be biased.'
There are two advantages to pursuing a recusal claim under
the Due Process Clause. First, the claim can be used against
both state and federal judges due to the incorporation doctrine,
whereas a section 455(a) claim can only be made against a
federal judge. Second, and most importantly in light of the
Liteky decision, a recusal claim under the Due Process Clause
takes the extrajudicial source doctrine completely out of consideration by the reviewing judge.'35 The main practical disadvantage to utilizing a due process claim is that it generally can
only be raised on appeal.
VI. CONCLUSION

Impartiality in our judiciary is essential to the effective functioning of the American legal system. In enacting section
455(a), Congress sought to "broaden and clarify the grounds for

132. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
133. Haines v. Liggett Group, 975 F.2d 81, 98 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lewis v.
Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982)); e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) ("[Any tribunal
permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also
must avoid even the appearance of bias.").
134. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150.
135. For an example of two cases where a litigant has successfully pursued Due
Process recusal claims, see Haines, 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992) and Nicodemus v.
Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1979).
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judicial disqualification."" 6 However, the achievement of that
goal was clouded by numerous circuit court decisions interpreting section 455(a) as containing the extrajudicial source doctrine. 3 7 In Liteky v. United States, the Supreme Court had a
chance to effectuate the purpose for enacting section 455(a) by
removing the extrajudicial source limitation from it. Nevertheless, the Court further entrenched the doctrine, while professing
to abandon it. The extrajudicial source doctrine is an unnecessary impediment to the fair administration of our laws: "Every
man is equally entitled to protection by law; but when the laws
undertake to add... artificial distinctions ...
the humble
members of society ...
who have neither the time nor the
means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to
complain of the injustice of their government.""

Lori M. McPherson

136. Act of Oct. 9, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351.
137. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
138. ANDREW JACKSON, VETO OF THE BANK BILL (1832) reprinted in BARTLETr'S
FAAILIAR QUOTATIONS, at 418:3 (15th ed. 1980).

